




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TAILORING ENDS TO MEANS: CLAUSEWITZ IN BELGIUM

Bruno Colson and Christophe Wasinski

Clausewitz was in Belgium for the last Napoleonic campaigns. To his beloved wife Marie von Brühl he wrote letters from Hasselt, Tournai, Aalst, and Oudenaarde in 1814, from Bastogne and Ciney in 1815. He said his admiration for the towns, the gothic churches, the city hall of Leuven and Brussels' park¹. Although this book is not about the Napoleonic wars, it is not without some interest to note the physical presence of Clausewitz on the Belgian battlefields of 1815, at Ligny and Wavre. As far as the reception of Clausewitz's works in Belgium is concerned, it has only been touched in a general way². The first French translation of *Vom Kriege* was made by an officer of the Belgian Army, where the only official language was French in the 19th century³. Belgian military thought between 1830 and 1914 has not been thoroughly explored yet but we know that the first French book substantially devoted to Clausewitz was also by a Belgian officer, Charles de Savoye⁴.

If there was a specific and enduring Belgian view of Clausewitz, it was built by the later General Emile Galet, who was the classmate and the personal adviser of King Albert I. In 1913-1914 he was professor at the War College in Brussels. Thinking about the difficult strategic position of a small neutral country between two great powers in a context of rising tensions, he developed what he called a principle: "*the proportionality existing between the means or forces one can rely upon and the aim one has in view*"⁵. Galet relied upon the following sentence from *Vom Kriege*: "*A prince or general who knows exactly how to organise his war according to his object and means, who does neither too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof of his genius*"⁶. In his recollections of the 1914 campaign, Galet repeated this sentence to explain the conduct of King Albert at the head of the Belgian Army and it was the only quotation he made from Clausewitz in this book⁷. In his course at the War College, Galet gave another quotation around the same theme, this time with the example of Frederick the Great of Prussia⁸. In a third quotation, Galet slightly modified the text by saying that "*it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy equal his strength*"⁹: Clausewitz had written "*double his strength*"⁹.

Galet's reading of Clausewitz formed the cornerstone of Belgian strategy during the First World War. As commander in chief, Albert I managed to keep his small army in being and refused to participate in the murderous offensives of the Allied powers until there was a clear prospect of success. In the fall of 1918 he committed his army to the final and victorious attack. In 1919 Galet, now a lieutenant colonel, was nominated at the head of the Royal Military Academy. In 1926, as a general, he became Chief of Staff of the Army. His ideas had been vindicated by the First World War and their formed the backbone of a specific Belgian school of strategy. Generals Prudent Nuyten and Raoul Van Overstraeten were his pupils and his followers, the second one becoming the military adviser of King Leopold III as Galet had been the one of Albert I¹⁰. After the Second World War, this school of thought persisted in the teaching of Henri Bernard, a former officer and resistant, whose lessons in military history printed their mark on several generations of Belgian officers. For Bernard, the first principle of military art was the one of "*proportionality of means and ends*"¹¹. Napoleon had failed to conform to it in the Waterloo campaign. To trace Clausewitz's reading in Belgium in the 21st century, we will consider first the military teaching at the Royal Military Academy¹². We will then turn to civilian universities with programmes in history and political science. Finally there will be a survey of current research and publications, military and civilian.

At the Royal Military Academy (RMA), Clausewitz appears mainly in the course entitled "*History of the art of war till 1945*"; currently held by Professor Luc De Vos. This course is divided into three parts: "*Introduction to the history of modern wars*", "*The First World War*" and "*The Second World War*". The teaching is given, in Dutch as well as in French, in the second year of bachelor in social and military sciences. A substantial part of it is devoted to the main military thinkers. Luc De Vos clearly states in his introduction that his course owes much to the ones given by his predecessors Raoul Van Overstraeten, Henri Bernard and Jean-Léon Charles¹³. The vision of Clausewitz is thus in the national tradition established by Galet but it is also more elaborated than what we mentioned earlier. In a first chapter devoted to theory, concepts and definitions, Clausewitz is given with Jomini as a co-founder of the widely spread "*principles and rules of the military art*". It is true that Clausewitz, mainly through his teaching to the crown prince of Prussia, was held as a believer in rules and in some regards contributed to some of the basic statements about war. But he certainly would have rejected his association with sets of rules and principles.

His main objective in writing *Vom Kriege* was precisely to deride the ones who like Jomini believed in such firm and immutable rules¹⁴. The end of the page reveals the origin of this vision of Clausewitz as it mentions explicitly the transmission of Galet's ideas about Clausewitz through Van Overstraeten and Bernard to the present and the establishment of rules and principles like the one about the proportionality of means and ends. This principle is indeed given as the first one to be observed and this is clearly the Belgian tradition which goes on. De Vos elaborates around it and stresses, besides the question of numbers, other factors such as logistics, the quality of training, time, space, command and the will to fight. Non military aspects also matter, especially the economy and politics. Irrationality can also supersede rationality¹⁵.

The section about military thinkers naturally devotes some pages to Clausewitz. As in the preceding section, he is associated with Jomini. One must never forget that the latter was much earlier studied in military academies, including the Belgian one, and there appears to be still a remnant of this privileged position. Although this section wrongly denies the intellectual relationship between the two thinkers, who actually read their mutual books and cited each other more than once, it rightly stresses their differences of approach. For Clausewitz, moral forces were of primary importance in war. Struck by the example of Napoleon, he advocated the necessity to concentrate on the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy without secondary moves, even if there was a human price to pay. Clausewitz is modern, says De Vos, because he put war within the wider context of the evolution of politics and society¹⁶. This section on military thinkers relies quite rightly upon the classical syntheses of Michael Handel and Peter Paret, mentioned in the bibliography¹⁷.

Clausewitz comes back in chapter II, devoted to the evolution of the waging of war in the western world. As the philosopher Johann Fichte, he noticed the evolution of war to a more violent form, due to the growing implication of the population. The march began towards what would be called "*total war*" by General Erich Ludendorff after the First World War¹⁸. In chapter IV, "*War, propaganda and the media*", Clausewitz is quoted to show that the achievement of surprise, an essential component of strategy, needs a blackout on information. But he also insisted on the support of public opinion and was particularly aware of the moral effect of victory or defeat¹⁹. Students at the RMA can meet Clausewitz again in their 1st and 2nd years of master in social and military sciences. An optional "*Introduction to Strategic Studies*" presents a more in-depth analysis of classical strategic thinkers. A special attention is given to what

is still relevant for understanding recent wars. The validity of Clausewitz's concepts is tested in relation to present-day conflicts. As Clausewitz advocated, the future officer is invited to think by himself in a critical way before taking a decision²⁰. Besides the *Masters of War* by M. Handel mentioned earlier, the bibliography of the course includes recent titles in English and French²¹.

Clausewitz could also be met at the Advanced Staff Course of the Royal Military Academy. This one year formation is given by military and civilian professors on six modules (world politics, strategic studies, Belgian foreign and security policy, collective defence and security, geopolitics, and strategic analytical model) to already experienced officers²². The name of Clausewitz is firstly mentioned in the world politics module to highlight the connexion of war as a continuation of politics. Students could also meet Clausewitz in more specialized lectures, depending on the service there are part of. For the Land Component, after a formation at the US Army Command and General Staff Course, Major Steven Van Den Bogaert has decided to insist on the importance of Clausewitz in his Belgian lectures²³. The thinking of Clausewitz is seen as more relevant than the "Jominian approach" to grasp the current and complex dynamics of warfare. Concerning the air component, Dr. Joseph Henrotin has been asked to provide lectures on contemporary airpower theories and concepts²⁴. When mentioned in these lectures, Clausewitz is considered as particularly relevant to underline the importance of the fog of war, in spite of the proliferation of electronic technologies supposed to reduce it to its minimum level in air warfare. Dr. Joseph Henrotin also considers the possibility to adapt the Clausewitzian trinity in order to add technology as a fourth dimension to it.

One must also acknowledge that the various military libraries are rather well furnished regarding Clausewitz. Numerous editions of his works in German, French, Dutch, English and also studies on Clausewitz can be found at the documentation centres of the Royal Army Museum, of the RMA in Brussels and at the Central Library of the Ministry of Defence at Evere, close to NATO headquarters. These libraries can easily be used by university fellows, as the authors of these lines can attest. University libraries are also rich in Clausewitz's writings, especially the French translations. This is not so much the case as far as recent studies on Clausewitz are concerned. To conclude, Clausewitz seems to be widely known among the Belgian officers and his books are frequently borrowed in military libraries²⁵. Some officers are said to be intensive readers of his work and even to go back to it again and again before operational departure. On the other hand, it also seemed that Clausewitz-

citing is sometimes lived as a compulsory attitude aimed at marking the belonging to a social group. Not much better, sometimes Clausewitz is also said to be quoted when an officer is lacking relevant ideas in his/her speech.

Now, let's turn towards the Belgian academic education. Clausewitz is sometimes mentioned during lectures on introduction to political science or on security studies in several Belgian universities²⁶. In the field of International Relations, one must especially take into consideration the course "*Stratégie et sécurité internationale*" by Michel Liégeois at the University of Louvain²⁷. In this course, Michel Liégeois discusses, among other Clausewitzian concepts, the primacy of politics, the trinity and the culminating point. His teaching also compares Clausewitz with Sun Zi and makes use of the works of B.H. Liddell Hart, Edward N. Luttwak and Martin van Creveld to illustrate the debates concerning the evolution of strategy. The teaching in military history at the University of Namur, the only one among the Belgian universities, should then be mentioned. It is of course less developed than at the RMA in terms of hours of teaching. It matters for three European credits transfer system (ECTS) in place of six at the RMA. Optional for students in their 3rd year of Bachelor in History, the course is entitled "*War and Strategy in Late Modern History*" and is given in French by Professor Bruno Colson²⁸. One of the first aims is to induce students to do research in military history. Main archival sources and major secondary works are presented, with case studies taken from the late modern history of Belgium (1792-1945). One hour is devoted to Clausewitz in the chapter about the evolution of strategic thinking from 1815 to 1914. Current debates between academic historians and political scientists about Clausewitz are mentioned. As this course is new, the comments of political scientists could in the future be located in the course of "*History of Political Ideas*", now given by Christophe Wasinski who also speaks about Clausewitz to students in Political Science (3rd year of Bachelor).

Research and publications on Clausewitz are more numerous in the French-speaking part of Belgium and are most of the time made in close cooperation with French colleagues and publishers. Besides his article on the first French translation of *Vom Kriege*, Bruno Colson has organized an exhibition at the University of Namur on military thinking from Machiavelli to Clausewitz, with an illustrated guide book²⁹. He is familiar with Clausewitz not only since his 1986 article but also since his first doctoral dissertation which was about Jomini's reception in the United States³⁰. As he specialized in military thinking in and about the Napoleonic wars, he mentioned Clausewitz in several publica-

tions³¹. He published three articles devoted to him, one of them being the text of his intervention at the Clausewitz conference organized at Saint-Cyr-Coëtquidan in October 2007³². As a member of the editorial board of the journal *War in History*, he wrote a review article about recent books on Clausewitz³³. His current research includes a *Napoleon's On War*, regrouping with due reference to their origin the various sentences of Napoleon on war, following the books and chapters of Clausewitz's magnum opus³⁴. Another book is in progress on the battle of Ligny, June 16, 1815, with the under-title *Napoleon versus Clausewitz*; this battle was indeed one of the four major ones where Clausewitz was physically facing the Emperor and the only one of them where he was wearing a Prussian uniform.

Christophe Wasinski began researching on Clausewitz for his master's thesis at Brussels' University. His work assessed the influence of Clausewitz in the United States from 1945 until 1999³⁵. Then, he extended his interest to other strategic authors in order to complete a doctoral dissertation about the representation of self and other in strategic thinking. He published the results of this dissertation, however, he took some distance with the current opinions concerning Clausewitz³⁶. The researches done on Clausewitz since the 1970s have had the tendency to transform him into an intellectual hero. As it is argued in some passages of Wasinski's book, it would also be wise to reconsider Clausewitz not only as completely exceptional but also, under some lights, as representative of purely classical strategic thinking³⁷.

Bruno Colson and Christophe Wasinski are also members of the "Réseau multidisciplinaire d'études stratégiques" or RMES (Multidisciplinary Network in Strategic Studies)³⁸. Other members of this network, that brings together civilian scholars from different French-speaking universities or from the Royal Military Academy and the Royal High Institute for Defence, have shown a great interest for Clausewitz. This is for example the case in the writings of Joseph Henrotin (see also above), the head of the editorial team of the French magazine *Défense et Sécurité Internationale*. Although not directly dedicated to Clausewitz, most of the books of Joseph Henrotin make use of numerous concepts inherited from the Prussian officer³⁹. This is also the case of some texts written by other members of the network, like Alain De Nève and Tanguy Struye de Swielande⁴⁰.

In another category are the books of Thierry Derbent⁴¹. Published by the independent Aden editions, they strongly focus on the connexions between Clausewitz, Marxism and revolutionary warfare. Derbent is particularly inter-

ested by the socialist-communist genealogy of Clausewitz: Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Vo Nguyen Giap and Lenin. Actually, it must be said that Derbent is a pseudonym for Bertrand Sassoie, a former active member of the Belgian Communist Combatant Cells (CCC). Sassoie and other members of the CCC were responsible for several bombings in the mid-eighties. He was released in 2000 after having been detained fourteen and an half years in jail⁴². Lastly, and far less sulphurous, are two books published in Brussels by the Editions Complexe in 1987. The first one was a reprint of the translation of Clausewitz’s 1812 campaign in Russia and the second one a volume gathering Raymond Aron’s articles on Clausewitz⁴³.

In conclusion, Belgium is certainly a place where Clausewitz is present, as he was in 1814 and 1815. At the centre of the European Union, Belgian military and university institutions are open to intellectual debate in other countries, especially in France, Britain and the United States. As such, members of their research communities contribute to the international publications and conferences about the great Prussian thinker, albeit modestly due to the dimensions of Belgium. Another problem is the specific Belgian view on and use of Clausewitz in the 21st century. As the teaching at the RMA can testify, the traditional accent on proportionality between ends and means, taken from Clausewitz by Galet, is still relevant. As it contributes to NATO military operations in Afghanistan, Belgium measures its commitment to what it estimates possible. This is truly common sense and one could say there is no need for Clausewitz in this regard. But Clausewitz has always been cited as an intellectual authority and the insistence of the Belgian government on its limited means was already frequent during the Cold War, as it was stressed by King Albert I during the First World War. Open to the reading of Clausewitz and to the necessary burden-sharing with its allies, Belgium still retains the Clausewitzian lesson that to exist politically a country cannot commit too much of its military forces to the same theatre of war.

Notes:

¹ *Karl und Marie von Clausewitz: Ein Lebensbild in Briefen und Tagebuchblättern*, ed. Karl Linnebach, Berlin, Martin Warneck, 1925, p. 367, 369, 371, 373, 375; Clausewitz (C. von), *Schriften, Aufsätze, Studien, Briefe, ...*, ed. Werner Hahlweg,

I, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1966 and II in 2 vol., 1990, II-2, p. 177-179.

² Jean-Michel Sterkendries, “Clausewitz et la pensée militaire belge”, *Actas. XVII Congreso internacional de ciencias históricas*, Madrid, International Commission of Military History, II, 1990, pp. 173-179.

³ Bruno Colson, “La première traduction française du *Vom Kriege* de Clausewitz et sa diffusion dans les milieux militaires français et belge avant 1914”, *Revue belge d’Histoire militaire*, 26, 1986-5, pp. 345-364.

⁴ Charles de Savoye, *Règlement sur le service des armées en campagne annoté d’après les meilleurs auteurs qui ont écrit sur l’art militaire*, 2^d ed., Paris, Dumaine, 1866; Benoît Durieux, *Clausewitz en France. Deux siècles de réflexion sur la guerre 1807-2007*, Paris, Institut de Stratégie comparée (ISC)-Collège interarmées de Défense (CID)-Fondation Saint-Cyr-Economica, 2008, pp. 71-73.

⁵ Musée royal de l’armée, Brussels (MRA), A 16 184, Ecole de guerre, Cours de tactique [stratégie] du commandant Galet, 1913, p. 6.

⁶ [Clausewitz], *Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung*, 10 vol., Berlin, Dümmler, 1832-1837, I, p. 198 (*Vom Kriege*, book III, chapter 1); english version from *On War*, ed. J.J. Graham, London, Trübner, 1873.

(<http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK3ch01.html>).

⁷ Emile Galet, *S.M. le roi Albert commandant en chef devant l’invasion allemande*, Paris, Plon, 1931, p. 85.

⁸ MRA, A 16 184, Cours de tactique [stratégie] du commandant Galet, 1913, p. 19.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30; [Clausewitz], *Hinterlassene Werke*, I, p. 231 (*Vom Kriege*, book III, chapter 8

(<http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK3ch08.html>).

¹⁰ J.-M. Sterkendries, “Clausewitz et la pensée militaire belge”, p. 176.

¹¹ Henri Bernard, *La campagne de 1815 en Belgique ou la faillite de la liaison et des transmissions*, with maps, Brussels, Imprimerie médicale et scientifique, 1954, pp. 3 and 75.

¹² We thank Luc De Vos, Jean-Michel Sterkendries and Alain De Nève for the information provided on the RMA curriculum.

¹³ Luc De Vos, *Introduction à l'histoire des guerres modernes*, Brussels, RMA, 2008-2009, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14. This page also mistakenly says that Clausewitz served for a time in the Austrian Army.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹⁷ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini*, London, Frank Cass, 1992; Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986.

¹⁸ L. De Vos, *Introduction*, p. 98.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

²⁰

http://cost.rma.ac.be/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85&Itemid=3&lang=fr

²¹ John Baylis, *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, *Traité de stratégie*, 5^e éd., Paris, ISC-Economica, 2006 (forthcoming translation by Oxford University Press); Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, London, Penguin Books, 2006.

²² See general description provided on:

http://cost.rma.ac.be/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=42&Itemid=13&lang=en.

²³ Personal email from Major Alain Vanhee, Monday, August 23, 2010.

²⁴ Joseph Henrotin, *L'airpower au 21^e siècle : enjeux et perspectives de la stratégie aérienne*, Brussels, Bruylant, 2005.

²⁵ Anonymous comments collected in August 2010.

²⁶ Personal emails from Thierry Balzacq (concerning his Introduction to Political Science at the University of Namur, FUNDP), February 16, 2010 and from Tom Sauer (concerning his lectures on International Security at the University of Antwerp), February 11, 2010. Phone conversation with André Dumoulin (concerning his lectures on Security Theories at the University of Liège), August 16, 2010. Barbara Delcourt, Lecturer on Security Theories at the University of Brussels, added that she decided to drop the reference to avoid limiting

herself to a familiarly mundane speech concerning Clausewitz (personal email, February 11, 2010).

²⁷ Personal email from Michel Liégeois, February 15, 2010. M. Liégeois, *Stratégie et sécurité internationale*, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2009-2010, especially pp. 36-63.

²⁸ The expression in French is “époque contemporaine” which is larger than “contemporary history” as it begins with the French Revolution in 1789.

²⁹ B. Colson, *L’art de la guerre de Machiavel à Clausewitz dans les collections de la Bibliothèque universitaire Moretus Plantin*, Namur, Presses universitaires de Namur, 1999.

³⁰ B. Colson, *La culture stratégique américaine. L’influence de Jomini*, Paris, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense nationale-Economica, 1993.

³¹ B. Colson, “Camon ou l’exégète de Napoléon” in Hubert Camon, *La guerre napoléonienne. Les systèmes d’opérations, théorie et technique*, Paris, ISC-Economica, 1997, pp. 5-17; abridged edition of Antoine-Henri Jomini, *Précis de l’art de la guerre*, Paris, Perrin, 2001; *Le général Rogiat, ingénieur et critique de Napoléon*, Paris, ISC-Economica, 2006; “Austerlitz vu par les stratèges et les tacticiens”, in *Austerlitz. Napoléon au cœur de l’Europe*, Musée de l’Armée-ISC-Economica, 2007, pp. 371-405; “La place et la nature de la manœuvre dans l’art de la guerre napoléonien”, in Christian Malis (ed.), *Guerre et manœuvre. Héritages et renouveau*, Paris, Economica-Fondation Saint-Cyr, 2009, pp. 118-140.

³² B. Colson, “La stratégie américaine de sécurité et la critique de Clausewitz”, in *Stratégique*, 76, 1999-4, pp. 151-164; “Perché è importante leggere Clausewitz”, *Contemporanea. Rivista di storia dell’800 e del’900* (Università di Bologna), XI-2, April 2008, pp. 301-305; “Clausewitz, le retour d’expérience et l’histoire”, in Laure Bardiès and Martin Motte (ed.), *De la guerre ? Clausewitz et la pensée stratégique contemporaine*, Paris, ISC-Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan-Fondation Saint-Cyr-Economica, 2008, pp. 349-359.

³³ “Clausewitz for Every War. Review Article”, forthcoming in *War in History*. Books under review include: Antulio J. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*, Oxford University Press, 2007; Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War*, Oxford University Press, 2007; Hew Strachan, *Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. A Biography*, Atlantic Books, 2007; Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (ed.), *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century*, Oxford University Press, 2007; Benoît Durieux, *Clausewitz en France. Deux siècles de réflex-*

ion sur la guerre 1807-2007, Economica, 2008; Peter Paret, *The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806*, Princeton University Press, 2009.

³⁴ Written in French, the book is going to be published in the year 2011.

³⁵ Christophe Wasinski, *Clausewitz et le discours stratégique américain de 1945 à nos jours*, Paris, ISC-Les Stratégiques (electronic document available on www.stratic.org/CW_TDM.htm). See also: Id., “Paradigme clausewitzien et discours stratégique aux Etats-Unis 1945-1999” in *Stratégique*, 78-79, 2000-2/3, pp. 75-119; Id., “Culture stratégique, dispositifs rhétoriques et concepts clausewitziens dans la pensée stratégique américaine”, in Laure Bardiès et Martin Motte (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 43-72.

³⁶ Id., *Rendre la guerre possible: la construction du sens commun stratégique*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2010.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-124.

³⁸ See : www.rmes.be

³⁹ Joseph Henrotin (ed.), *Au risque du chaos: leçons politiques et stratégiques de la guerre d'Irak*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2004; *L'airpower au 21^e siècle (op. cit.)*; *La technologie militaire en question: le cas de l'armée américaine*, Paris, Economica, 2008; *La résilience dans l'antiterrorisme : le dernier bouclier*, Paris, L'Esprit du Livre, 2010.

⁴⁰ Alain De Nève and Joseph Henrotin, “La *Network Centric Warfare*: de son développement à *Iraqi Freedom*” in *Stratégique*, 86-87, March 2006, pp. 53-76; Tanguy Struye de Swielande, “L'asymétrie instrumentale et ontologico-stratégique dans l'après guerre froide”, *Arès*, vol. XXI, n° 54, October 2004, pp. 107-115.

⁴¹ Thierry Derbent, *Clausewitz et la guerre populaire*, Brussels, Aden, 2004 and *Giap et Clausewitz*, Brussels, Aden, 2006.

⁴² R.P., “Bertrand Sassoie, l'illuminé sincère”, *La Libre Belgique*, June 6, 2008. (www.lalibre.be/actu/belgique/article/425977/bertrand-sassoie-l-illumine-sincere.html); Marc Metdepenningen, “Bertand Sassoie instruit les militaires de Saint-Cyr”, *Le Soir*, June 26, 2008 ([//archives.lesoir.be/bertrand-sassoie-instruit-les-militaires-de-saint-cyr_t-20080626-00GP41.html](http://archives.lesoir.be/bertrand-sassoie-instruit-les-militaires-de-saint-cyr_t-20080626-00GP41.html)).

⁴³ Clausewitz, *La campagne de 1812 en Russie*, introd. by Gérard Chaliand, Brussels, Complexe, 1987; Raymond Aron, *Sur Clausewitz*, introd. by Pierre Hassner, Brussels, Complexe, 1987.